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In early 2006 the Irish Government announced a Pilot Initiative for 
Collaborative Projects from Industry-Led Networks, the latest in a series of 
policies on ‘business networking’ that date back to the mid-1980s. The purpose of 
this chapter is to describe and comment on those policies by reviewing the 
previous literature (both academic and policy documents). What we stress is that 
over the years and across different policies, the precise focus has varied, in terms 
of networking aims and objectives and networking forms.1  
We appreciate that there is considerable confusion in the wider discussions 
as to the meaning of ‘networks’ and ‘networking’ in a business context, and 
indeed this has been recognized before in analysis of Irish policy (for example, in 
Forfás (2004)). However, our approach is to avoid much of that confusion by 
simply centring discussion on those (inter-related and overlapping) areas of policy 
that the literature on Ireland consistently addresses when considering ‘business 
networking’, namely: ‘linkages’ between ‘local’ firms and 
transnational/multinational corporation (TNCs); training networks; research and 
development (R&D) networks; inter-firm cooperation processes more widely. 
These four topics are respectively the prime focus of successive Sections in this 
Chapter.  
Our discussion culminates in a consideration of the prospects for  the 
successful impact of the 2006 Pilot. We welcome the initiative as seeming to 
represent a welcome seed-change in policy, and offer preliminary insights into 
how it might be evaluated. In doing so we introduce the notion of ‘public interest 
evaluation’ (PIE), intended to assess the extent to which public interests are 
served by a particular policy. Part of the idea is that whilst the Pilot is focused on 
(to some extent) measurable benefits to participating enterprises from networking 
projects, it might also be desirable to consider other effects on wider publics. 
 
2. LINKAGES  
The first explicit policy in Ireland centred on some form of networking 
appears to have been the National Linkage Programme (NLP). Introduced in 1985 
as a response to criticism about reliance on foreign controlled TNCs, its objectives 
were to increase “the purchase of local materials and services by overseas firms” 
and to develop “a strong indigenous sub-supply base” (Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment, 2003, p.85). In its early years the NLP concentrated on 
“helping individual companies to meet the requirements of [TNCs] and thereby 
sub-contractors” (National Economic and Social Council (NESC), 1996, p. 32); the 
implication is that it had a focus on ‘hub-and-spoke’ networks (see, for example, 
Markusen, 1996).2 However, we will see below that this precise networking form 
altered in the late 1990s. 
According to Ruane (2001), the NLP carried two policy risks (p. 4): “a 
linkage marriage that ‘failed’ and damaged a TNC (say because the local company 
did not deliver) could undermine an industrial development strategy that was 
heavily based on promotion of foreign direct investment, and the inevitability of 
selectivity amongst local companies chosen to participate in the programme could 
give rise to complaints from companies that were not selected.” Consequently, to 
reduce “the appearance of selectivity” and “minimise” the risk, “a general 
database on sub-supply was established, to which all companies were given 
access.” Ruane concludes that “this twin approach of general support for linkages 
combined with particular support for certain companies … mirrors the general 
approach to industrial policy pursued in Ireland over the past four decades.” 
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Indeed, we would argue that elements of the approach are present in the 2006 
Pilot, as will be evidenced in Section 5. 
Another characteristic revealed early in the NLP and that that we would 
argue permeates Irish policy more widely is an awareness of international 
dimensions: Ruane (2001) observes that during the first two years of the 
programme the approach was to engage TNCs by helping them to build their 
European sub-supply chains and, in that context, identify potential within Ireland. 
The objective was for TNCS to see the programme as enabling rather than 
constraining; the means was to avoid a parochially Irish perspective. 
By 1997, Ruane (2001, p. 6) argues, “the linkage programme had 
contributed successfully to building up a local sub-supply industry” in 
electronics, its particular target.3 However, she also contends that by that time 
“the goal posts had completely shifted”, and again an awareness of the 
international dimension is revealed. The problem is that “the electronics industry 
had come to the fore as the most globalised industry in the world, leading policy-
makers to question the meaning of local linkages.” As a result the programme was 
restructured – an International Business Linkages Division was established within 
Enterprise Ireland (EI) - and stress was placed on “the globalisation of the local 
supply industry.” This was to be achieved by assisting local companies in, for 
example, establishing cheaper sub-supply sources in Central and Eastern 
Europe.4 
Ruane (2001, pp. 6-7) summarises Ireland’s linkage programme in the 
period 1998-2001 as “in marked contrast to what had been undertaken 
previously – and indeed … a new interpretation of the concept of linkages ... From 
the Irish policy perspective, there are now no border distinctions in this 
international business context: the [TNCs] can be based anywhere; the local 
companies may not even be producing locally.” In short, Ruane observes a 
significant alteration in the networking form that the policy is designed to 
stimulate: “the approach is moving increasingly towards the building of supply 
networks and supply chains rather than direct [TNC]-local company linkages.”  
Since 2001 there have been further alterations. The International Business 
Linkages Division within EI has been disbanded and linkages have been 
addressed through a wide-ranging set of initiatives designed to enable firms in 
Ireland – TNCs and indigenous – to meet and interact with each other and with 
firms from elsewhere, for example at Technology Roadmap Seminars, at 
conferences and on trade missions (see, for example,  Enterprise Ireland, 2004). It 
is not that linkages have been abandoned as an issue. Rather, the trend 
identified by Ruane (2001) towards an emphasis on global supply networks seems 
to have been carried forward by their being fostered without the special focus of a 
National Linkages Programme per se (see, for example,  Enterprise Ireland 
(2005)). 
As for empirical data on policy outcomes, for the early years of the NLP, up 
to 1990, Ruane (2001) finds relatively sparse evidence of brokered linkages per 
se. Compare with this the perhaps more upbeat message from the then Minister 
for Industry and Commerce: it was estimated that, in 1986, Irish sub-suppliers 
undertook approximately £40 million worth of additional business because of the 
programme.5 See also NESC (1996), citing an alliance of electronic companies, 
Orbitech, as an apparently successful case of networking stimulated under the 
NLP. More generally, Forfás (2004) argues that the NLP failed to reach its full 
potential, but gives no explanation for this view. Jacobsen and Heanue (2003) 
suggest that the policy had some success, local sourcing increasing until the 
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early 1990s but then levelling off. Further, according to UNECE/EBRD (2001), 
during 1985-1987 the estimated 250 foreign affiliates involved in the programme 
increased their local purchases of raw materials fourfold. Over the same period, 
the sales and employment of local suppliers rose by 83% and 33%, respectively: 
“several have become successful international subcontractors; some of the larger 
domestic supplier companies involved in the NLP have subsequently been 
acquired by foreign TNCs” (ibid, p. 20). Ruane (2001) also considers the sales 
data, albeit recognising that it can severely overestimate linkages. Excluding 
electronics, she finds that in 1985 foreign TNCs in Ireland’s non-food 
manufacturing sectors purchased 17% of inputs locally, and by 2000 this had 
risen to 23%. By contrast, in electronics – the especial target – purchases 
increased from below 10% to over 30%.   
Ruane also reports that in 1996 there was a major review of the linkage 
programme in the context of European Union funding. This indicated the need for 
data that would enable both “general evaluation purposes” (ibid, p. 8) and the 
management of linkages by the policy agencies.6 We would see such comments as 
a more general warning that all policies – including other policies on business 
networking – be accompanied by measures for data collection so as to permit 
appropriate evaluation. 
Overall, Ruane (2001, p. 12) concludes that “it is hard to either totally 
prove or disprove” whether linkage polices have been successful, and she sees 
Irish policy as entering a new era. This is one in which “the role of traditional 
linkage programmes has changed and they are now seen as just one part of a 
development strategy which integrates [TNCs] further into the Irish economy and 
develops the capacity of local companies. The former is now focused strongly on 
building relationships between [TNCs] and universities, and the latter is 
concentrating on building up skills and R&D in local companies in a networking 
context.” It is to these policies that we now turn. 
 
3. TRAINING 
NESC (1996) and Forfás (2004) identify the Plato Programme as another 
early networking initiative. Locally focused, the underlying ideas originated in a 
project to spur regional economic development in Belgium, and the first Irish 
Plato initiative was in 1993 in Dublin. According to NESC (ibid, p 32), the focus is 
on business training networks, “in which local owner/managers are encouraged 
to learn from one another and from the advice of local large enterprises who act 
as facilitators of small working groups.” In the mid 1990s the programme 
involved “60 small companies and 10 larger ‘parent’ firms”, and apparently 
“achieved considerable success” (ibid, p. 32). 
The number of Plato networks has since risen; Forfás (2004) reports 8. 
Nowadays “it is primarily supported by Chambers of Commerce and County 
Enterprise Boards. It is the largest private-sector led network initiative involving 
over 1000 companies around Ireland” (ibid, pp. 35-36).7 According to Forfás (p. 
36), “the aim of the Plato initiative is to establish a broadly based business 
support structure which provides opportunities for SME [small and medium sized 
enterprise] owner managers to develop their management skills”, but “it also 
creates opportunities for commercial development through local and international 
networking.” In short, it appears to go beyond a training concern, incorporating 
additional networking objectives. 
Over more recent years there has also been a further, distinct training 
programme involving a relatively wide set of economic actors: the ongoing 
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Skillnets initiative, introduced in 1999. According to Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment (2003, p. 138), the objective is “to improve workforce 
training at enterprise level, particularly among SMEs.” The initiative “is 
administered by Skillnets, an independent company whose board includes 
employer, union and state representatives” (ibid, p. 138). Forfás (2004, p. 36) 
explains that “the key difference between Skillnets and other training schemes 
which provide support for individual firms is the Skillnets’ focus on mobilising 
groups or networks of companies to develop strategic answers tailor-made to their 
own specific needs.”  
Further and current information on Skillnets can be found at 
www.skillnets.com. One point of particular interest is that the website views 
networks as “flexible and non-hierarchical with members sharing in decision-
making and the design and implementation of strategies”.8 In contrast, the 
international academic literature reveals major differences across network types 
in practice, as clearly shown in the review by Powell and Smith-Doerr (1993). For 
example, in their typology of subcontracting networks Sacchetti and Sugden 
(2003) suggest the extremes of a spectrum. On the one hand there are ‘networks 
of direction’, in which core participants exert their power, pursuing their own 
aims and other strategies despite the preferences and resistance of others. 
Indeed, we would suggest that this form might well characterise networks realised 
under the NLP; networks of direction include ‘hub-and-spoke’ networks, as well 
as some of the apparently more complex arrangements in modern supply 
networks. On the other hand there are ‘networks of mutual dependence’, 
featuring symmetrical shaping of strategic direction amongst network 
participants based upon shared responsibilities. Further, these network types 
have significantly different implications for performance. For example, whilst 
networks of direction imply the achievement of the objectives of core firms, those 
objectives may or may not coincide with the ultimate goals of directed firms. 
Consequently, “the expansion of actors’ productive potential through networking 
may or may not correspond to an increase in the opportunities of all the 
participants in the network” (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003, p. 684) The Skillnets 
website might seem to imply that there is no room for such tensions in strategic 
interests within a Skillnets initiative. However, and notwithstanding the 
information made available within Skillnets about network formation and 
operation, it is not clear to us precisely which aspects of the programme ensure 
that there are no such outcomes.  
According to the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (2003, 
p.138), an “evaluation” in 2001 found that projects supported by Skillnets had 
encompassed over 2,300 companies and 12,800 employees. Nearly 75% of those 
companies had under fifty employees, and “a sizable proportion of them had not 
previously engaged in formal workforce training.” We would observe that Storey 
(2000) would see such concerns not as ‘evaluation’ but as Step 1 monitoring; this 
is the least sophisticated form of evaluation, albeit a building block for 
evaluation. 
Skillnets own website provides more up-to-date information. It reports that 
over 5000 firms have participated in 90 training networks. There were 55 
networks over 2002-2005, in excess of 83% of participating companies being 
SMEs. The website also comments on apparent motivations and outcomes. Firms 
are said to have found that Skillnets training is: “more cost efficient as they have 
better buying power as well as Skillnets funding”; “more relevant”, “flexible”, 
“accessible” and “useful”; “more informed as companies learn from and support 
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one another in the process”; “better facilitated as companies have full time 
management staff to organise network training and other activities on their 
behalf”; “more suited to enterprise needs as companies themselves decide all 
aspects of the networks strategy, plans and activities; “more beneficial as 
companies in the network receive new information, share ideas, develop new 
relationships with their peers in other companies and tap into a wide range of 
business opportunities that arise from being part of an inter-firm network.”9 
Similarly to the point we made in relation to the Plato programme, this last 
comment seems to indicate that the networking focused on training has beneficial 
spillovers to influences and objectives more widely. 
 
4. R&D 
A third focal-point in Ireland’s policies involving business networking is 
R&D. Again, this reveals a focus on networking forms that go beyond the 
relatively simple linkages envisaged in the early years of the NLP. Moreover, there 
is recognition that networks impacting on businesses need to span more than the 
businesses themselves 
Specifically, Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (2003, p. 
12) argues that Irish policy agencies are actively fostering “strong links and 
networks … between the research community and the enterprise sector.” It seems 
to view the objectives of networking in terms of innovation and entrepreneurship, 
the approach being “to foster Irish counterparts of the kind of strong research-
industry networks found in Silicon Valley and the ‘Miracle Mile’ which links 
Harvard, MIT, and Boston University. These have generated numerous high-tech 
start-ups as well as major global companies such as Microsoft and Sun 
Microsystems” (p. 124). This might imply measuring policy success in terms of 
high-tech start ups and, in the long run, growth into global companies. 
In terms of particular initiatives, Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment (2003) highlights the Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) programme 
for Centres in Science, Engineering and Technology (CSET). This “is designed to 
create centres formed by clusters of internationally recognised researchers from 
the third level sector10 and industry. These centres will … address crucial 
research questions, foster the development of new and existing Irish based 
technology companies, attract industry that could make an important 
contribution to Ireland and its economy, and expand educational and career 
opportunities in Ireland in science and engineering” (p. 124). Forfás (2004, p. 44) 
mentions that there is a CSET focus on “high-end research programmes in 
biotechnology and ICT.”   
Forfás (2004) also lists various other initiatives in this area: EI supports 
cooperation between industry and academia through its Innovation Partnership, 
its Programmes for Advanced Technology and its Technology Transfer Initiative, 
designed to enable local SMEs in the Western seaboard area access to the 
locality’s universities.  More marginally concerned with networking, Forfás (p. 40) 
also indicates that “applications to [EI’s] Research Technology and Innovation 
(RTI) competitive grants scheme that involve a company in collaboration with a 
partner (another company, third level or research body) receive a higher 
assessment rating than applications that are submitted by a company on its 
own.” Having recognised this, however, Forfás goes on to comment that the 
quantity of such funding is small. This is perhaps not surprising, given that it is 
not the main focus of RTI.   
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In its most recent strategy document, EI has stressed the significance of 
R&D collaboration: “we will be particularly concerned with building R&D and 
commercialisation interaction between firms (regardless of size and ownership) 
and third level institutions and research bodies” (Enterprise Ireland, 2005, p 15). 
Most especially, for example, the Industry-Led Research Programmes refer to a 
pilot initiative for the Irish wireless sensor network industry (see www.enterprise-
ireland.com for further details). The characteristics of networking that is 
industry-led without concern for firm size or ownership are also seen in the 2006 
Pilot on Industry-Led Networks, discussed in the next Section. 
Furthermore, Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (2003) 
points to regional initiatives that impact on R&D. In particular, it refers to active 
engagement of “the enterprise agencies … in an enabling role at regional level 
with local authorities, higher educational bodies, and others aimed at 
strengthening regional environments for enterprise. This involves fostering 
stronger links between new and established industry in the regions and the 
universities and institutes of technology, adopting a pro-active approach to 
infrastructural development particularly in the area of telecommunications, and 
sourcing incubator space for new technology start-ups” (p. 202). Included in this, 
the Shannon Development Knowledge Network “seeks to bring business, 
education and innovation together in a number of locations in the region — the 
National Technology Park Limerick; Kerry Technology Park; Tipperary Technology 
Park; and the Information Age Park Ennis. Each of these centres contains an 
Innovations Works incubator facility designed to support emerging knowledge 
based enterprise” (p. 204).  
There have been various studies examining the impacts of ‘networking’ on 
aspects of R&D in Ireland. Included in these, the discussion of the specific case of 
the dairy industry by O’Connell et al (1997) is relevant. As regards R&D, they 
recognise (amongst other things) the presence of “informal co-operation, mostly 
linked to problem solving. Managers regularly consult each other on issues 
regarding production processes, equipment, engineering and assist each other in 
times of inventory shortages” (p. 59). They argue that such “co-operation is often 
based on personal relationships, involving a high level of trust and integrity. The 
Irish dairy industry is a small industry where all the players know each other. 
Managers gave evidence of strong social and commercial interaction between 
competitors” (p. 59). We would also suggest that these comments are a reminder 
of the potential importance – perhaps most especially in the context of the sort of 
economic and social culture that characterises Ireland – of the prospects for a 
form of networking that is informal yet influential (albeit in the particular case of 
the dairy industry at that time, O’Connell et al conclude (p. 60) that “co-operation 
in technical problem-solving, although helpful, is not likely to have a significant 
impact on innovation”).11 
 
5. COOPERATION MORE WIDELY  
In discussing the Plato Programme and Skillnets in Section 3, we indicated 
that they both seem to have cooperation impacts more widely, beyond training. 
We now turn to a consideration of policies that appear to focus explicitly on the 
broader effects of cooperation (albeit also overlapping with the concerns we have 
already addressed). 
As far back as the mid-1990s, NESC called for a new initiative, and in 
doing so explicitly distinguished what it had in mind from the NLP. The aim 
would be to stimulate clusters, and the programme would stress sets of 
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cooperating firms. The idea was to “encourage the formation of networks of 
companies. Such networks could use their combined resources to strengthen 
their capabilities as sub-contactors, but the programme would not be limited to 
the field of sub-contracting. It would be applicable to companies regardless of 
who their final customers were, in both domestic and export markets” (NESC, 
1996, p. 32). 
Indeed, a Pilot Network Programme (PNP) was introduced in 1996. It 
appears that this was a mix of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, enabling 
networks that were to some extent state as well as industry-led, but with a 
specific focus on neither. It required at least three firms in each network, and 
(unlike the 2006 Pilot) entailed a concern with networking potential, not 
exclusively collaborative projects.12 “The PNP – involving 17 networks and a total 
of 31 SMEs … – aimed to encourage small firms to co-operate in activities they 
were unable to undertake individually due to their small scale. The objective of 
the PNP was to put in place some of the resources needed to facilitate and 
establish formal networks …, to help the networks devise joint solutions to 
common problems and to evaluate the results” (Heanue and Jacobsen, 2003, 
p.15). For NESC (1999), the “principle” of the policy “is that companies have 
access to the kind of resources which, operating alone, they do not have at their 
disposal. It enables SMEs to co-operate in a significant way in strategic activities 
such as marketing and product/process development” (p. 344).  
The PNP ran for six months (Forfás, 2004). According to Jacobsen and 
Heanue (2003) there was no publication of its final assessment, although in 
earlier work they did find evidence of success amongst a network of furniture 
producers that developed under its influence (Heanue and Jacobson, 2002). 
Forfás (2004) asserts that the “main benefit” of networks resulting from the PNP 
was that they “enabled the companies involved to work together as a team in 
strategic development of new business opportunities” (p. 35). It also comments 
that an “internal evaluation” concluded that the PNP “had succeeded in all its 
objectives. The view was strongly expressed that a longer term national 
programme would nurture a strong networking culture in Ireland, leading to a 
more internationally competitive and innovative SME base.” Notwithstanding our 
interest in this conclusion, we would query the appropriateness of an ‘evaluation’ 
being solely undertaken internally, given the potential ‘internal bias’ that might 
exist in such an approach. 
A broader perspective on the impacts of networking is also suggested by 
certain activities of EI. These include its helping to create and develop the Irish 
Photonics Association. Apparently, EI “has sought to bring the major companies 
in the sector together” (Forfás, 2004, p. 66); it has facilitated the network by 
arranging meetings and providing venues. The Irish Photonics Association was 
established in 2002 with aims that include creating an environment “where we 
know each other and can help each other to develop the Irish Photonics sector” 
(p. 67). It is argued by Forfás (p. 42) that EI has “played a similar role … in other 
sectors.”  
Moreover, a broader perspective is certainly seen in yet another currently 
ongoing policy initiative: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
(2003, p. 185) reports support by InterTradeIreland for “networks designed to 
help businesses North and South to build strategic relationships and exchange 
market information so as to optimise the potential for all-island trade expansion 
and business co-operation.”13 
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Furthermore, a wider-ranging concern with the effects of networking is seen 
in the efforts of regional development agencies, notably Shannon Development. 
Forfás (2004) reports on Supply Network Shannon (SNS), whose formation in the 
late 1990s was stimulated by Shannon Development, which continues to play an 
active supporting role, alongside EI. SNS “is an open, sectoral network of 
engineering and electronics sub-supply companies located in the Shannon 
region” (ibid, p. 41). Reportedly it initially focused on “training and promotion” 
but it then moved on to a concern with “business issues such as supply chain 
management …., technical issues relevant to engineering and electrical 
manufacturers and ICT usage.” Shannon Development has also initiated the 
European Digital Media Network and supported the Atlantic Technology Corridor, 
a network “initially started by a group of [TNCs] in the western seaboard area who 
were concerned with inadequacies in the region’s economic and physical 
infrastructure” (ibid, p.40). The Atlantic Technology Corridor now also 
encompasses linkages with the University of Limerick, National University of 
Ireland Galway and other higher education institutions. 
Nevertheless, in terms of national policy support for networking with wide-
ranging effects, putting North-South issues to one side and focusing on initiatives 
that are squarely concentrated on the Republic, we conclude that the PNP is 
notable for its apparent success, brief lifespan and lack of successors. At least, 
that is, until 2006.  
 
6. THE 2006 PILOT INITIATIVE 
In its 2004 report to Ireland’s Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment, the influential Enterprise Strategy Group (2004, p. xiii) envisaged “a 
growing role for the private sector in driving initiatives through networks of 
companies with common interests. Strong enterprise-led networks are required 
that will establish the strategic agenda for their areas of activity… Increasing 
focus must be placed on supporting the emergence of such networks to inform 
the effective orientation and delivery of state supports.” It argues that this would 
amount to a radical shift from the previous dominance of individual firm-oriented 
industrial policy, and appears to be motivated at least in part by perceived 
European Union restrictions.  
In the press release accompanying publication of the report, the then 
Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment asserted: “coherent networks 
have not been a sufficiently strong feature of our enterprise landscape to date, 
despite the advantages that collaboration and co-operation offer. Making more 
supports available through business networks is likely to bring new strategic 
benefits and more efficient use of resources.” As a consequence the government 
committed itself to a new pilot programme, which was duly launched in February 
2006: the Pilot Initiative for Collaborative Projects from Industry-Led Networks. 
The key points of the Pilot can be summarised as follows: 
(1) The aim is “to support … groups of companies who wish to undertake a time 
limited collaborative project that has the potential to result in measurable 
benefits to the companies involved and to the wider economy.”14 The 
maximum project duration is 24 months.15   
(2) Specifically, the Pilot will support through grant aid up to 10 network 
projects, and in its early stage will provide facilitation funding so that 
“potential networks” might “identify suitable projects for collaboration.” 
(3) It is necessary for a project to “involve activities that are additional to what is 
currently being carried out by the network and the individual companies.”  
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(4) Further, “only projects that are not suitable for existing supports will be 
considered”; most especially, projects for training or R&D are covered by 
other policies and are ineligible.16 
(5) Support is to be allocated through a competitive bidding process:  
– Successful submissions for facilitation are eligible for 100% funding (of 
up to €20,000).  
– Successful submissions for a project are eligible for up to 50% of 
networking costs (of up to €200,000); this support will only be for the 
project, not for administration of the network itself; the network’s own 
contribution to project costs may be up to one half in cash, the 
remainder in kind.  
(6) Network projects “must include at least five companies who are clients of the 
development agencies.”17 Firm size and ownership is not an explicit concern; 
projects may encompass TNCs, SMEs, micro-firms, indigenous and foreign 
firms. 
(7) There is no particular concern with network form; an all-encompassing 
approach is adopted - networks can be virtual, vertical or any other form. 
(8) The Pilot focuses on networks that spread into the North of Ireland and that 
span “the extended value chain”, for example encompassing academics and 
venture capitalists.   
(9) The aim is “to support collaborative projects that have been identified by 
companies as potential contributors to development and growth.” Companies 
(and industry) are seen as the driver; this is seen as a ‘bottom-up’ and not a 
‘top-down’, state driven approach (in contrast to PNP). The focus on 
collaboration is distinct from that of ‘participation’, with the latter seen to 
imply meetings at conferences, seminars, and other such events, without 
their leading to projects.  
(10) Specifically, projects might be supported under two categories:  
(a) Category 1: support is because projects contribute to “achieving national 
economic development objectives”, namely: “regional development”; “rural 
development”; “entrepreneurship”; “all island or cross border 
company/network initiatives”; “women in enterprise”  
(b) Category 2: support is because projects contribute to “achieving joint 
company development objectives”. In particular, this refers to 
“measurable business performance improvements for the network 
members” that might include: “sectoral/sub-sectoral development 
initiatives”; “supply-chain optimisation”; “developing scale of 
operations/realising economies of scale”; “exploring export market 
opportunities”; “virtual networks”; “projects that are not listed but will 
lead to increased economic performance (i.e. sales, exports, employment, 
productivity, competitiveness) in participating companies.”  
(11) The scheme is to be operated, for state aid purposes, as aid under the de 
minimis rule. 
It is worth noting that the aims and objectives reflected in point (10) clearly 
reflect the sorts of issues that underlay policy on linkages, training and R&D, but 
they also embrace wider ranging concerns. With respect to point (5), the 50% co-
funding requirement for network projects is interesting. It is not clear to us why 
50% rather than another amount – the partners’ contribution under Skillnets is 
only 25% - and we would question if the effect might be to prevent some perhaps 
worthy enterprises or sectors from participating in the programme, because they 
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cannot raise their half of the funding. The risk is what Wren (2005) refers to as 
Type I error. 
It could be argued that the 50% requirement also indicates some form of 
targeting, in which case the success of the policy will be determined in part by the 
strategic decision-making process for choosing targets (on which see the 
discussion of various approaches to targeting in Cowling et al (1999)).18 
Consistent with the likes of Dewey (1927), we would simply query if that choice 
process is in fact in the public interest in Ireland; it is not clear to us that this 
issue has been in any sense ‘independently’ addressed and answered in the 
industrial policy context.19 
A targeting query is also raised by point (6), the requirement that at least 5 
companies in a project be development agency clients. Apparently, the selectivity 
approach described by Ruane (2001) for the NLP is alive and kicking. Whilst this 
approach might be practical and efficient, we would offer the reminder that it 
might yield closed environments, where the risk is stagnation. Indeed, in a 
different context, Lenihan et al (2005) argue that a “poor culture of evaluating 
industrial policy interventions” has tended to span policy-making and academic 
arenas in Ireland. Contemplating why this has been the case, one set of reasons 
is drawn from Ruane (2004), and they include; a “political tradition of ‘client-
focus’ which may bias against economic rationality” (Lenihan et al, 2005, p. 78). 
We suggest that evaluation of the Pilot would need to assess any bias from this 
favoured client tactic, which permeates the heart of the policy.  
Furthermore, we would query the lack of discrimination as to network form, 
point (7). We argued earlier, in our discussion of Skillnets, that the existence of a 
spectrum of different network forms raises substantive issues for economic 
impact. In particular, the Pilot focuses on specific project outcomes, and it might 
be argued that if all that matters is those outcomes, network form is an irrelevant 
detail. However, and as we will explore in Section 6.2, there might also be wider 
public interest implications as a result of the networking that it is appropriate to 
evaluate. In that event, network form might be significant. 
 
6.1 Project Evaluation 
Consistent with accepted good practice by development agencies, all 
projects deemed eligible for consideration for Pilot funding go through an internal 
evaluation process led by EI,20 which has specified the project ‘evaluation’ 
criteria.  These include, amongst others (www.enterprise-ireland.com/networks): 
(A) “The business/economic case for carrying out the project including 
justification of the network's need for financial assistance to support the 
project. 
(B) The expected impact of the proposed project on the participant companies' 
competitive position. 
(C) The ability of the project to achieve measurable economic 
improvements/benefits to the participant companies in terms of 
regional/social/sectoral development, sales, exports, employment, 
productivity, competitiveness. 
(D) How these benefits are additional to what is achievable through existing 
enterprise supports currently funded by the State. 
(E) Evidence that the project is additional to the existing activities of the 
network and its members.”   
Publishing these criteria is a refreshing and significant step forward, 
supporting the view of Lenihan et al (2005) that the evaluation culture in Ireland 
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is improving. More specifically, we welcome the fact that (A) addresses a key 
element of the ‘market failure’ argument: only projects needing financial 
assistance are considered for support (an approach that also aims to minimize 
deadweight spending). In a similar vein, we applaud that (D) and (E) encapsulate 
the concept of project ‘additionality’.   
However, having recognized these points and appreciating that the initiative 
is a pilot, we would observe that some of the criteria are vague and perhaps 
problematic for ‘evaluation’.  For example, it is unclear exactly what is meant by 
achieving “regional development” or “competitiveness”. This makes their 
measurement (and therefore measurement of policy impact) extremely 
challenging, if not impossible. Consider also the focus on employment. Storey 
(2000) makes the point that “increasing employment” is less clear than providing 
a specific target, “such as increasing employment by 5 per cent over a 5 year 
period” (p. 177). We also note from point (10) of our policy summary that projects 
might be supported on the basis of their contribution to, for example, 
entrepreneurship and/or rural development, but these are omitted from EI’s 
specified ‘evaluation’ criteria. 
Further, (B) and (C) seem to require that claimed impacts on national 
economic development objectives must be viewed in terms of measurable effects 
on participant companies. We would respond to this apparent fusion of 
participant company effects and national development objectives with another 
note of caution. In their analysis of policy deadweight in Ireland, Lenihan and 
Hart (2004) draw on Stiglitz (1988) in considering a market failure rationale for 
industrial policy. They argue, for example, that policy is needed because of 
positive externalities in training and R&D, a market failure that implies social 
benefits exceed private benefits. This is the classic argument that an individual 
firm will undertake a sub-optimal amount of training and R&D because it will 
ignore the wider social benefits. The point of policy is thus to increase training 
and R&D beyond the private benefit. The Lenihan and Hart argument can be 
generalised to policy on business networking: it might be that the advantages (or 
indeed disadvantages) of networking for training, R&D, linkages and other 
performance concerns are felt beyond the companies participating in the network. 
Put another way, there are wider and in particular public interests. On this basis 
it might seem that the Pilot is restrictive, denying the rationale for policy provided 
by the market failure analysis of externalities. Perhaps there will be a failure to 
satisfy public interests.21  
 
6.2 Prospects for the Way Forward: Policy Evaluation Issues  
It of course remains to be seen what the 2006 Pilot will bring in practice, 
but it does seem to represent a welcome seed-change in industrial policy: it 
promotes support for networking with wide-ranging effects to a centre-piece of 
national policy; it embodies the clear development of Ireland’s evaluation culture 
It might also represent an important step along a development path that places 
especial stress on indigenous capability without dependence on external centres 
of strategic economic power. 
It appears to us that Ireland’s linkage programmes have been very much 
based on the strategic agenda and choices of TNCs, initially designed to link into 
those firms investing in Ireland and then more recently switching so as to link 
into global supply networks wherever core firms are located. Whilst it is in some 
sense reasonable to argue that the goal posts of linkage policy moved because of 
globalisation, necessitating this switch, at a fundamental level all that really 
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happened is that, as the strategic choices of the TNCs altered, so too did the form 
of networking which they required. Fundamentally, nothing altered. Moreover, as 
has been suggested elsewhere, whilst playing to the economic development 
agenda of TNCs might bring some benefits, it is advisable to see such an 
approach as part of a dual economic strategy that also encompasses indigenous 
firms. Most especially, it might be appropriate to embrace the identification and 
pursuit of an economic agenda that is democratically determined by all of those 
with an interest in the economy (Cowling and Sugden, 1998; Sugden and Wilson, 
2002). This would likely point towards a special stress on indigenous 
development potential regardless of inward investors. Arguably, such a purpose 
has underlain (at least some aspects of the) policy initiatives focused on training 
and R&D networks. Even so, the 2006 Pilot might suggest a coherent and 
significant move further down a development path focused on indigenous 
capability without dependence on large foreign corporations or indeed any other 
external centre of strategic economic power. Given the Pilot’s seeming disregard 
for firm size and ownership, however, that is unclear; whether or not it turns out 
to be the case might be determined by rigorous evaluation of the policy, not only 
in its Pilot phase but also subsequently. 
Over the last few years awareness of the necessity for appropriate policy 
evaluation has increased in Ireland, and it might seem that the Pilot’s stress on 
measurable, additional impacts from networking projects is consistent with that 
need. However, we would urge that it is not sufficient to ‘evaluate’ at the 
individual project level; the actual scheme also needs to be evaluated. Indeed, it 
would appear that some such evaluation is being contemplated, although we have 
no way of knowing in exactly what form. Despite that, and even if there has been 
serious consideration of ‘how’ to evaluate the Pilot, we feel that the following 
comments might still prove informative.  
Before considering ex-post concerns we refer to some aspects of ex-ante 
evaluation (Roper et al, 2004). At the time of writing, we have no way of knowing 
with certainty whether or not an ex-ante evaluation of the Pilot scheme has taken 
place. Our distinct impression, however, is that it has not: it appears that a 
recommendation for business networking came from the Enterprise Strategy 
Group (2004), it was accepted by the then Minister and EI were tasked with the 
administration and implementation of the Pilot, with input from the Department 
of Enterprise Trade and Employment.22 If this impression is correct, and as with 
all such industrial policy interventions, we would suggest that it would have been 
more appropriate to have invested greater effort in an ex-ante evaluation ever 
before any public funding was committed; after all and as highlighted by ESRI 
(1997, p. xv), “the opportunity cost of public funds is high.”  
In the case of the Pilot it might be argued that opportunity still exists to 
delve more deeply into ex-ante evaluation issues before more funding is 
committed, precisely because it is a pilot, and if that were to happen we would 
recommend a more clear specification not only of the objectives for actual 
projects, but also for the overall scheme. We would point again to the work of 
Storey (2000), who argues that “a fundamental principle of evaluation is that it 
must first specify the objectives of policy” (p. 177).  
More widely, if evaluation means rigorous assessment of policy against 
aims and objectives, then we would urge that it must take place continuously, 
throughout the policy process, from design through implementation to final 
outcome and ex post reflection. 
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There appears to be a genuine concern amongst Irish policymakers to 
engage in policy evaluation. The challenge, as always, is ‘how to evaluate’ (choice 
of method). As Lenihan and Hart (2004) argue, “carrying out a full-scale 
longitudinal set of case studies, control group analysis, selection and assistance 
modelling, and predictive modelling are methodological minimum standards now 
becoming embedded within much of the evaluation work on industrial policy in 
Ireland and the rest of the European Union” (our emphasis, p. 836). We would 
also advocate, however, the importance of embracing and looking to best-practice 
international studies as regards appropriate evaluation methodologies, including 
ex-post evaluation methodologies. As outlined by Lenihan et al (2005) 
“increasingly, best practice in evaluation research is pointing towards the use of 
econometric treatment models … which account for ‘selection’ and ‘assistance’ 
effects” (p. 80). Further, Lenihan et al allude to the fact that a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative perspectives is perhaps optimal in an evaluation 
methodology. Finally, their study points to the work of, amongst others, 
Georghiou (2004a), who focuses on the notion of “behavioural additionality’. 
According to Lenihan et al (ibid, p. 81), “the idea here is that upon receipt of 
financial assistance ... firms may employ a different strategy and hence firm’s 
behaviour may be affected vis-à-vis what was the case prior to government 
intervention.”  One can only begin to imagine the significant changes in individual 
firm behaviour that might result from a network of firms coming together to work 
on a project brought about because of government support. We would 
recommend that serious consideration be given by policymakers to including 
measures of behavioural additionality in any proposed ex-post evaluation 
framework of the 2006 Pilot. 
Furthermore, a feature of our comments has been a concern with the 
public interest, and in line with that we would advocate as one of the dimensions 
of an evaluation process a focus on what we term ‘public interest evaluation’ 
(PIE), the general purpose of which would be to assess the extent to which public 
interests are served by a particular policy. Part of the idea is that whilst the Pilot 
is focused on (to some extent) measurable benefits to participating enterprises 
from networking projects, it might nevertheless also be deemed desirable not to 
ignore other effects on wider publics, for example: on consumers who might face 
firms with increased market power as a result of the cooperation fostered and 
facilitated by the network; on consumers who might gain from lower prices 
associated with economies of scale resulting from networking activities; on 
citizens who experience congestion or other environmental impacts (positive or 
negative) as a result of the increased ‘success’ of network participants.23 Whilst 
there would appear to be clear indications that the design of the Pilot was 
cognisant of certain market power concerns, our impression is that, overall, 
explicit and systematic consideration of public interests in any policy evaluation 
to date has not yet been concentrated upon.24 Rather, the essential concern with 
the Pilot appears to be to measure economic deliverables as defined by the 
network participants in line with project objectives.   
Precisely what PIE would necessitate is something that must await further 
research into suitable methodologies. For now we would note that it entails a 
dynamic evaluation according to the public interest criteria throughout the policy 
process, from design through implementation to final outcome and ex post 
reflection. The challenge is fourfold: to identify relevant publics25; to determine 
the interests of those publics; to translate those public interests into measurable 
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effects; to elucidate methodologies for evaluating the degree to which those public 
interests are impacted by a particular networking policy.  
Our general appeal to a notion of public interest is in line with Branston et 
al (2006). They propose a search for policies that highlight outcomes which reflect 
public and not merely private interests. In doing so they draw on Long (1990), 
who views the public interest as a standard, agreed upon by a public and against 
which actions can be reasonably assessed. According to him, “by arriving at some 
consensus, a moving one, we agree on what is important both for policy and 
research and the latter becomes a more purposive, disciplined, cooperative 
endeavour as opposed to a matter of fad, fashion, and funding. For public 
administration and political science, the appropriate standard of evaluation 
would appear to be the public interest” (pp. 170-171). Because Branston et al 
(2006) are concerned with inclusive rather than exclusive economic processes, 
they endorse the public interest as “also an appropriate standard for much of 
economics.” 
On the issue of identifying publics with an interest in business networking, 
two categories can be specified: first, public interests ‘within’ the network, 
amongst its participants; second, public interests ‘outside’ the network, amongst 
those not its participants. Consider, for example, a network of direction in which 
core firms determine overall strategy and other firms play periphery roles: as we 
reported in Section 3, this is the sort of organisation sometimes seen in global 
supply networks. The periphery firms have an interest in the strategic choices of 
the core; they are a public. Further, consumers or citizens outside the network 
are also publics, with corresponding interests. We would see the challenge of 
identifying publics outside the network as especially problematic.  
As for the determination of the precise interests of a public, we recognise 
that, ideally, what is in issue is democratic interests. Again this is in line with 
Branston et al (2006). In endorsing a public interest criteria, they add to Long by 
considering the determination of the public interest. In particular, they “argue for 
the agreed upon, evolving concerns that are the public interest … to be 
determined democratically.” The essential reason is that the identification of a 
public interest is a strategic concern for that public; the identification needs to be 
made by a democratic process encompassing all interested parties, otherwise 
exclusive interests might impose their own preferences, despite the wishes of 
others. Following Bailey et al (2006), this would seem to suggest that the PIE 
necessitates evaluation according to the degree to which policies serve the 
democratically determined public interest (although in reality, when analysing a 
particular circumstance the precise specification of the democratically determined 
public interest is likely to be unknown, and it will need to be in some way 
approximated as part of the evaluation process). 
The elucidation of methodologies for evaluating the degree to which public 
interests are impacted by a particular networking policy would draw heavily on 
current international best practice in the mainstream evaluation literature. We 
have discussed some aspects of this at various points in this chapter, and will not 
repeat those discussions here. Suffice to note that we would again stress the 
significance of additionality. Indeed, drawing on Georghiou’s (2004b) discussion, 
we define ‘public interest additionality’ as a specific form of output additionality, 
namely: the sum of public interests that would not have been achieved without 
the support of the policy. Moreover, in general this would include an aspect of 
behavioural additionality, because there is a public interest in certain forms of 
behaviour; most notably and in line with our comments on the determination of 
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public interests, there is a public interest in democratic behaviour.  Furthermore, 
we would emphasise that there are important lessons to be learned from 
evaluations in regional and urban policy that go beyond economic issues 
narrowly conceived, encompassing social and political impacts. This is shown, for 
example, by the discussion of community economic development initiatives in 
Armstrong et al (2002) and Armstrong and Wells (2006). Evaluation of such 
polices has included a concern with clear and precise quantitative and qualitative 
measures of the interests of wide-ranging groups. This encompasses the 
identification of interests and democratic processes, issues that we consider 
pertinent to an evaluation of policies on business networking in general, and to 





                                                 
1 For more detail and further comment on Irish policy on business networking, 
see Lenihan and Sugden (2006).  
2 The inward investor is the ‘hub’, which has bilateral relations with each of 
several sub-contractors, linked to the hub via a ‘spoke’. 
3 UNECE/EBRD (2001) reports that there was also a focus on engineering and, 
over more recent years, healthcare. 
4 Consider also the Regional Markets/International Partnerships Programme. 
According to NESC (1996), it was focused on increasing exports to selected 
European regions through creating international production and trade relations 
between firms from Ireland and those regions, although NESC also argues that it 
resulted in “linkages … in relation to other aspects of development.” Examples are 
said to include: Italian design input to Irish knitwear companies; Italian 
technology being used in the Irish textile industry. 
5 Dáil Éireann, Volume 372 - 05 May, 1987: Written Answers. - National Linkage 
Programme, Minister for Industry and Commerce (Mr. Reynolds). 
6 This experience is consistent with the more general case for Irish industrial 
policy evaluation (Lenihan et al, 2005). 
7 It appears that Chambers have more recently withdrawn their involvement, at 
least in some instances. 
8 www.skillnets.com, accessed on 10th March 2006. 
9 Ibid. 
10 The term ‘third level sector’ refers to higher education institutions, including 
Universities.  
11 See also Callanan’s (2000) assessment of personal networks - including 
international networks - as an apparently crucial positive influence on the 
activities and success of the Shannon Free Airport Development Company.  
12 There are recent informal indications that when a group of firms is requested to 
specify a collaborative project, as opposed to merely forming or maintaining a 
network, then they tend to encounter problems. 
13 This is a policy that needs to be understood in the context of political changes 
on the island of Ireland, but our concern in this paper is restricted to more 
narrowly economic issues. For discussion of business linkages on the island of 
Ireland, including evidence, see InterTradeIreland (2004, 2005). 
14 The quotes in this description are all from www.enterprise-
ireland.com/networks, accessed on 17th April 2004.   
15 It appears that networks are seen as coming together to carry out a project, 
dissolving, and then perhaps coming together subsequently for another project. 
16 To police any duplication with other policy initiatives, it appears that an 
informal approach is used (for example, telephone calls to other development 
agencies). 
17 In the two approved projects made from the first call for proposals (deadline 3rd 
March 2006), it would seem that all firms are agency clients. 
18 Cowling et al (1999) question the suitability of targeting processes that are not 
open and democratic, which is to say that, following the analysis of Branston et al 
(2006), they advocate targeting that is in the public interest. 
19 For Dewey (1927), if the consequences of an act are essentially confined to the 
persons directly engaged in it, the act is private. However, if the consequences are 
felt more widely then “the act acquires a public capacity” (p. 244), the public 
being those who are “indirectly and seriously affected for good or for evil” by the 
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act (p. 257). Drawing on Dewey, Long (1990) sees a public’s shared concern with 
consequences of private parties’ actions as a public interest. 
20 The process includes an independent assessor from the private sector 
‘evaluating’ and ranking each project; we welcome this feature as it is likely to 
introduce additional objectivity. 
21 This is not to say that the public interest is reducible to merely market forces. 
22 The policy design does not appear to have been based on substantial 
international evidence/experience (albeit there are indications that some evidence 
may have been drawn from Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Canada and 
Australia).  
23 Again we would emphasise: despite these examples, the Deweyan framework 
we are following does not reduce the public interest to simply market 
externalities. 
24 There are indications of awareness that some public interests might effectively 
be considered through other policy agencies; for example, that if successful 
networks increase their economic activity and thereby require expanded 
premises, certain environmental externalities will be addressed in planning 
processes. 
25 The scale of the challenge is suggested by Dewey’s (1927) discussion of publics 
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